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Abstract
The notion of individual privacy has always been a political one throughout Russia’s Soviet and post-Soviet periods, but in
the age of all-encompassing datafication and digitisation of identities, privacy has become an even more contested con-
cept. This article considers how Russian state officials and Russian digital rights advocates construct the notion of privacy
in their public online discourses. I argue that how these actors talk about privacy helps shape the norms and the politics
around it in Russia. An in-depth analysis of activity reports published online by the state internet regulator and a grassroots
digital rights group reveals competing privacy discourses underpinned by differential understandings of how anonymity,
secrecy, confidentiality, and control of personal data determine the distribution of power and agency in Russian public and
political life. These differential interpretations of privacy inform the contentious politics that emerge around how privacy
is regulated and negotiated within the greater regulatory and normative framework of digital citizenship in Russia. Thus,
the article offers critical insights into the contestation of citizenship and, consequently, the distribution of power in more
and less democratic systems.
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1. Introduction
With digital technologies and networked internet
platforms firmly embedded in the mainstream polit-
ical and social life, and amid increasing datafication
(Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013; Van Dijck, 2014)
of all facets of society and identity, media and commu-
nications scholarship is increasingly concerned with how
these forces are shaping the distribution of power and
agency among the various actors involved in this ecosys-
tem. This study focuses on the notion of privacy in the
networked era and the emerging politics around it as
closely related to issues of control, power, and agency.
Examining the case of Russia, I argue that certain state
and non-state actors engage in public discourse to artic-
ulate competing conceptions of privacy politics, and that
these discursive articulations underpin different visions
of how agency, power, and control should be distributed
in a datafied society. Capturing these divergent ideas can
offer valuable insights about how the state and citizens
in Russia—and other networked authoritarian states—
understand the meaning of privacy and its place in the
emergent construction of digital citizenship.
Section 2 charts the development of the concept of
privacy inmedia and communications scholarship, under-
scoring the highly contextual, relational, and political na-
ture of privacy in technological systems andmediated en-
vironments. This section then discusses the understand-
ing of privacy in theRussian context, andhow the concept
has evolved from the Soviet era to themodern times. The
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study then presents arguments for examining the discur-
sive representations of privacy as a way of understanding
the competing politics of privacy in Russia today.
Section 3 briefly introduces the two sources of pri-
vacy discourse in this study: the Russian state regula-
tor Roskomnadzor (RKN) and the digital rights group
Roskomsvoboda (RKS). It then outlines the collection
of publicly available activity and monitoring reports
produced by both organisations and describes the ap-
proach used to analyse the privacy-related discourses
that emerge from these public communications.
Section 4 presents an analysis of how both the state
regulator and the digital rights group discursively con-
struct privacy as contextual, relational, and political. The
analysis suggests that the discursive representations of
privacy by the state regulator and the digital rights ac-
tivists are in competition with one another, and illus-
trates how this divergence informs the contentious poli-
tics of privacy in Russia.
Lastly, Section 5 presents concluding thoughts about
the competing discursive articulations of privacy and
the resulting politics of privacy in Russia, as reflected
in the state’s struggle for control over accessibility of
private data and the grassroots resistance against re-
strictions of personal data flows. The section concludes
with suggestions for future research by media and com-
munication scholars into privacy politics and its discur-
sive construction.
2. Articulating Privacy and Its Politics
This section first unpacks how the concept of privacy
is discussed in media and communications scholarship.
Next, it traces the evolution of the notion of privacy in
Russian political and public life. Finally, it argues for the
importance of attending to the discursive construction
and representation of privacy by state and non-state ac-
tors as a vital force that shapes the politics of privacy in
the Russian national context.
2.1. The Concept of Privacy in Media and
Communications Scholarship
Pinning down the exact definition or nature of privacy as
a concept is an ongoing struggle within media and com-
munications scholarship (and, for that matter, in other
disciplines as well). Nissenbaum (2010, p. 2) suggests
it is less useful to grasp whether privacy is “a claim, a
right, an interest, a value, a preference, or merely a state
of existence” than to trace the concerns related to pri-
vacy with regard to technological systems and digitally-
mediated practices related to flows of personal informa-
tion. Rather than arguing for privacy to be understood
as a purely descriptive, normative, or legal concept, it
seems more productive to examine how certain descrip-
tions of privacy, norms, or regulations around it engen-
der anxiety, resistance, or struggle for control over acces-
sibility and/or restrictions of personal data flows.
Following Nissenbaum’s (2010) logic, Möller and
Nowak (2018) suggest that privacy can be best under-
stood as contextual, relational, and political. They argue
that in line with Nissenbaum’s (2010) idea of “contextual
integrity,” privacy is best conceptualised and reconcep-
tualised with regard to specific contexts. Further, privacy
is not only understood in relation to individuals, but is
realised or threatened as a constant process of strategic
determination (Trepte et al., 2017;Westin, 2015) with re-
gard to how their personal information flows between
them and other individuals and institutions in society
(Möller & Nowak, 2018). In this regard, privacy can also
be understood as relational because it relates to and is
informed by a multitude of other issues, from surveil-
lance and control to anonymity, confidentiality, and se-
curity. Finally, privacy can be understood as political or
participatory (Möller & Nowak, 2018), as increasingly
privacy-related decisions and activity impact other ac-
tors in any individual’s networks, and have implications
for political participation, individual safety of dissidents
(when coupledwith surveillance), and the overall climate
of political freedom and expression—or lack thereof—in
both democratic and non-democratic societies. I posit,
therefore, that the contextual and relational articula-
tions of the politics of privacy are intrinsically connected
to broader issues of power, agency, and control in the
framework of digital citizenship as it is understood and
performed by various actors, including states, platforms,
media, and citizens.
2.2. Privacy in Russia’s Networked Authoritarian State
The notion of individual privacy has always been a polit-
ical one throughout Russia’s Soviet and post-Soviet peri-
ods, connected as it was to the culture of pervasive state
surveillance (Lokot, 2018) and the struggle to control
thoughts, opinions, and information flows in both public
and private lives of citizens (Gorny, 2007). Reflecting on
the Bolsheviks’ view that anything private was deprived
of social meaning and thus politically dangerous, Boym
(1994, p. 73) concludes that in early Soviet Russia “per-
sonal life seems rather to fit a concept of publicly sanc-
tioned guilt and of a heightened sense of duty.” However,
in the age of all-encompassing datafication and digitisa-
tion of identities, privacy has become an even more con-
tested concept in Russia, given the citizens’ embrace of
digital technologies and the state’s preoccupation with
control over data and information flows as part of the
national security and sovereignty project. This has led to
the emergence of what Greene (2012, after MacKinnon,
2011) terms ‘networked authoritarianism’: a regime in
which the state prioritises developing networked infras-
tructure and digital connectivity, while seeking to control
all spheres of the datafied social life.
The term ‘privacy’ itself (приватность [privatnost]
in Russian) is a term clearly borrowed from other lan-
guages (Levontina, Shmelev, & Zaliznyak, 2017) and a
fairly recent addition to everyday Russian vocabulary,
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though other partial representations of it such as con-
fidentiality, secrecy, and ‘private life,’ predate it (Boym,
1994). But privacy in the modern sense, including the pri-
vacy of personally identifying information, individual com-
munications, behaviour, and digital data traces, is only
now entering the mainstream legal, political, and social
discourse in Russia. In legislative terms, for instance, this
has meant that the traditional repertoire of legal protec-
tions for confidentiality of private communications and
‘private life’ has been expanded to include personal data
protection (e.g., Federal Law “On Personal Data” [Russian
Federation, 2006])—but also that access to user data and
metadata stored by online entities and social media plat-
forms is viewed by the state and law enforcement as a
matter of national security (Soldatov & Borogan, 2013),
while citizens increasingly perceive state policies in the
area of data localisation (Sargsyan, 2016) and internet
sovereignty (Lipman & Lokot, 2019) as threats to individ-
ual privacy. It is therefore important to investigate the
competing representations of this concept in the Russian
discursive public sphere and to capture how these com-
peting forces in the field of privacy might reflect the over-
arching power struggles in society and represent compet-
ing ideas of the political power of the state and its citizens,
spanning from hegemony to democracy.
2.3. Discursive Constructions of Privacy
This article considers how the Russian state and Russian
digital rights advocates construct competing notions of
privacy in their public-oriented discourses. Subscribing
to a post-structuralist, critical approach that sees dis-
courses as never separate from reality, but possessing
the power to co-create it (Fairclough, 2013), I argue
that how these actors conceptualise and contextualise
privacy in their communications with the public helps
shape the politics around privacy in Russia. An in-depth
analysis of the text corpora of regularly published activ-
ity and monitoring reports by the state internet regula-
tor and one of Russia’s most prominent grassroots digi-
tal rights groups points to competing privacy discourses,
concerned with questions of how privacy is understood,
what value it possesses, and how it is conveyed, con-
trolled, or restricted. The discursively constructed poli-
tics of privacy, I argue, are underpinned by differential
understandings of how anonymity, secrecy, confidential-
ity, and control of personal data determine the distribu-
tion of power and agency in Russian public life.
In addition to being an empirical study of the Russian
context that contributes to Russia-focused literature on
internet governance and free expression online, this ar-
ticle applies the analytical privacy framework developed
by Möller and Nowak (2018) to discursive constructions
of privacy. It thus aims to make a novel theoretical con-
tribution to the media and communications scholarship
on privacy by articulating the connections between how
the politics of privacy is represented discursively and
how its divergent representations shape internet regula-
tion, freedomof expression online, and digital citizenship
in Russia.
3. Research Design and Methods
Though specific legislative, political, and other practices
on the part of the state and the digital rights activistsmay
point to the competing notions of privacy in Russia, it
is equally important to examine how state and civic ac-
tors articulate these ideas in discursive terms in digitally-
mediated spaces. Therefore, I chose to examine publicly
available activity reports produced by Russia’s state in-
ternet regulator, RKN, and by RKS, one of Russia’s most
prominent digital rights groups, to understand how these
communications are used to shape discursive represen-
tations of privacy.
RKN (also known as the Federal Service for Su-
pervision of Communications, Information Technology
and Mass Media) is the Russian federal executive body
taskedwith oversight, monitoring and censorship of elec-
tronic media, mass communications, information tech-
nology, and telecommunications (Turovsky, 2015). It op-
erates as an independent agency under the auspices of
the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications,
and Mass Media. RKN oversees compliance with rele-
vant Russian legislation and manages Russia’s extensive
banned websites registry.
The grassroots digital rights initiative whose privacy-
related discourses I examine is RKS, one of the main dig-
ital rights advocacy groups in Russia. It was founded in
2012 bymembers of the Pirate Party in Russia (Merzlikin,
2019) to address the early crackdown on internet free-
doms that has since escalated. Initially monitoring the
Russian state internet blacklist, RKS has since expanded
its remit to digital literacy work, online privacy and se-
curity workshops, advocacy campaigns for internet free-
dom and digital rights, and even offering legal assistance
to Russian citizens prosecuted for internet activity.
I collected publicly available Russian-language activ-
ity reports from the official websites of the two organ-
isations (https://rkn.gov.ru and https://roskomsvoboda.
org), published between the start of 2015 and the start
of 2019, a period of turbulent change in Russia’s digi-
tal society and its governance. These reports (annual in
the case of RKN, monthly in the case of RKS) represent
key issues and activity performed or overseen by these
actors in conjunction with their work. As these reports
are regular, structured and explicitly aimed at disclosure
for public consumption, they present a useful source of
discourse about issues related to digital rights and pri-
vacy more specifically. For each organisation, I also col-
lected the text from their ‘About’ or ‘Mission’ sections
to capture how each organisation articulates its mission
and objectives in the context of their work. Sampling
their discourses in thisway allows to capture fairly recent,
but also regular and well-structured discourse relating
to digital rights, communication, and information, and
to locate any references to privacy therein. The discur-
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sive representations of privacy stemming from the anal-
ysis of these text corpora can then be connected to spe-
cific activity, showing how the competing politics of pri-
vacy shape state regulations, policy interventions, and ac-
tivist efforts.
I collated the texts collected from each source
into two text corpora. The resulting corpora contain
157,912 words (RKN) and 158,905 words (RKS), respec-
tively. The RKN corpus contains text from five annual re-
ports (154,584 words) and text from the ‘About’ page
of RKN’s website (3,328 words). The RKS corpus con-
tains text from 54 monthly reports (158,743 words)
and text from the ‘Our Mission’ page of RKS’s website
(162words). I then used AntConc (Anthony, 2019), a free-
ware tool for conducting corpus linguistics and concor-
dance analysis on large volumes of text, and specifically
its ‘Concordance’ tool. A concordance is a commonly
used display format in corpus linguistics similar to a table
that shows instances of a selection of words in their con-
text. I focused on concordances of specific words com-
monly used in privacy discourses—in this case the lem-
mas ‘privacy’ (приватность [privatnost], noun), ‘pri-
vate’ (приватный [privatnyy] or частный [chastnyy],
adjective), and ‘personal’ (персональный [personalnyy]
or личный [lichnyy], adjective)—to uncover the seman-
tic context in which they are most commonly used by
each actor. Lemmaswere used in order to capture all pos-
sible word endings and word forms in Russian.
AntConc has been used previously in communica-
tions, media, and policy research outside of corpus
linguistics (e.g., Baker & McEnery, 2015; Fairclough,
2016; Lokot & Diakopoulos, 2016). Likewise, privacy and
surveillance studies have often relied on discourse analy-
sis to capture how public debates around privacy norms
develop (e.g., Cichy & Salge, 2015; Möllers & Hälterlein,
2013). While the use of corpora in discourse analysis is
well-documented (e.g., Baker, 2006), in this study a cor-
pus linguistics tool was used primarily in order to reveal
how privacy is discursively constructed by each organi-
sation and how these discourses around privacy diverge.
The frequency of specificwords in this contextwas of less
importance than the discourses that emerged around
the privacy-related keywords in the RKN and RKS cor-
pora. Therefore, though raw and relative frequencies for
key terms are provided throughout, the analysis in this
study is mostly qualitative in nature and examines the
semantic fields (Fairclough, 2016) associatedwith the oc-
currence of privacy-related keywords in each corpus via
their clusters, collocates, and concordances. Relevant ex-
amples from the text corpora provided in the article have
been translated into English by the author.
4. Findings: Competing Discursive Constructions
of Privacy
The raw (FO) and relative (normalised, FN) frequencies of
the privacy-related keywords (lemmas) in both text cor-
pora are presented in Table 1.
4.1. RKN
A key observation from the RKN corpus is that the
state regulator never once uses the more modern
Russian term ‘privacy’ (приватность)—instead, the
term of choice is the more commonly used ‘private life’
(частнаяжизнь [chastnaya zhyzn]; FO = 76 per 157,912
words, FN = 4.812807133), along with terms such as
‘personal’ or ‘family’ used to denote personal or pri-
vate contexts. Another notable observation is the cou-
pling of ‘inviolability’ (неприкосновенность [neprikos-
novennost]) with the context of privacy and private in-
formation (collocation frequency with ‘private’ within
five words to the left or right at FO = 16 per 157,912
words, FN = 1.013222554)—this is not surprising, as
these terms are often co-located in Russian legal par-
lance in information- and privacy-related contexts. An ex-
ample of such collocation can be found in RKN’s 2017 an-
nual report, where the state blocked website registry is
described as: “A regulatory instrument unique to inter-
national law that allows to protect the rights of Russian
citizens to inviolability of their private life, their personal
and family secrecy” (RKN, 2018, author’s translation).
The state regulator’s public communications discuss
privacy in a predominantly instrumental context, refer-
ring to the ‘personal data’ of individuals (FO = 599
per 157,912 words, FN = 37.932519378), but rarely dis-
cussing individuals as active agents exercising their rights
or freedoms. The focus is overwhelmingly on what is be-
ing done to the individual/user, rather than on their own
actions: i.e., their private life is protected (by the state),
and their personal data is collected and stored (by the
state or third parties).
In its 2015 annual report, RKN describes a state offi-
cial from the President’s Office speaking at an RKN com-
mitteemeeting and stressing that: “Themain priority for
state oversight and protection of personal data should
be…the provision of individual security without infring-
ing on private life” (RKN, 2016, author’s translation).
Table 1. Raw and relative keyword frequencies in the RKN and RKS text corpora.
Keyword RKN FO RKN FN * RKS FO RKS FN *
Privacy 0 per 157,912 0 29 per 158,905 1.824989774
Private 79 per 157,912 5.002786362 288 per 158,905 18.124036374
Personal 645 per 157,912 40.845534222 334 per 158,905 21.648154558
Note: * Relative frequency FN per 10,000 words.
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These instances point to the preoccupation of the
state with monitoring citizen online activity, establishing
blanket digital surveillance, and ensuring ad-hoc access
to personal information flows, while seeking to shield it
from external actors.
Individual rights to privacy are framed in RKN’s dis-
course as rights of ‘personal data subjects,’ reinforc-
ing the instrumental context of state-controlled subjects
generating data. In the RKN corpus, discourse related to
‘defence’ and ‘protection’ tends to be clustered together
with ‘personal’ data of subjects and not with discussion
of their individual privacy. For instance, in its 2018 an-
nual report, RKN elaborates on practical and preventa-
tive measures implemented that year and, among other
activities, boasts that: “The greatest number of preven-
tative training events was held in the area of personal
data protection—12,579 activities in total” (RKN, 2019,
author’s translation).
In a similar activity summary in the 2017 annual re-
port, RKN reports that: “Greater attention was given to
events aimed at school pupils and students in order to
cultivate a culture of care with regard to their personal
data” (RKN, 2018, author’s translation).
This discursive instrumentalisation of privacy ex-
tends from protecting copyright and intellectual prop-
erty to personal data to defending the interests of the
Russian state in cyberspace. In all of these cases, the ob-
ject being protected is either information or the state,
and not the privacy of individuals.
The privacy-adjacent discourse around security and
safety in the text corpus further confirms this: The RKN
corpus clusters ‘digital security’ alongside ‘personal data
protection’ and ‘safe online behaviour’. The focus is on
a secure and safe environment and data, as well as law
and order, rather than on the individual and their privacy
choices. In the 2018 report, the state regulator explicitly
states: “In the context of the global transformation of the
informationworld order, we see [our]main goal as ensur-
ing security and protection for society and citizens from
relevant cyberthreats” (RKN, 2019, author’s translation).
Thus, individual privacy and privacy of personal data
flows is predominantly contextualised by RKN as a mat-
ter of national security and presented as a function of
the sovereign state retaining control over information
and data of its ‘subjects’ to protect them against exter-
nal threats.
4.2. RKS
Unlike the state regulator, RKS readily uses both ‘pri-
vacy’ and ‘private’ (in both its traditional and modern
forms) in its public discourse online (see Table 1 for fre-
quencies). In the RKS corpus, these terms most com-
monly co-occur with ‘rights’ (collocation frequency with
‘privacy/private’ within five words to the left or right
at FO = 42 per 158,905 words, FN = 2.643088638), life
(collocation frequency with ‘privacy/private’ within five
words to the left or right at FO = 42 per 158,905 words,
FN = 2.643088638), ‘information’ (collocation frequency
with ‘privacy/private’ within fivewords to the left or right
at FO = 22 per 158,905 words, FN = 1.384475001), ‘in-
violability’ (collocation frequency with ‘privacy/private’
within five words to the left or right at FO = 10
per 158,905 words, FN = 0.629306819), ‘data’ (colloca-
tion frequency with privacy/private within five words
to the left or right at FO = 10 per 158,905 words,
FN = 0.629306819), and ‘personal’ (collocation fre-
quencywith ‘privacy/private’within fivewords to the left
or right at FO = 8 per 158,905 words, FN = 0.503445455),
as well as in the context of protecting privacy and
anonymity of users.
In its mission statement (RKS, 2019, author’s trans-
lation), the digital rights organisation describes its aims
in the following way: “Roskomsvoboda organises broad
public campaigns and supports civic initiatives in favour
of freedom of information and inviolability of the per-
sonal data of users.”
In contrast to the state discourse, privacy in the
discourse of digital rights activists is more closely con-
nected to the rights and interests of individual citizens.
Throughout the RKS corpus, RKS often refers to ‘your
privacy’ (two-word cluster FO = 13 per 158,905 words,
FN = 0.818098864) or ‘their privacy’ (two-word cluster
FO = 9 per 158,905 words, FN = 0.566376137), draw-
ing direct connections between the individual and their
work. For instance, in a January 2015monthly report, the
organisation notes their legal director, Sarkis Darbinyan,
participated in a seminar on internet regulation in the
Russian city of Voronezh: “Darbinyan presented a short
summary of technologies that help users, website own-
ers and journalists circumvent the blocking of Internet
resources and preserve their privacy online by using new
digital rights such as the right to anonymity and encryp-
tion” (RKS, 2015a, author’s translation).
The privacy-related discourse of RKS is more con-
cernedwith agency in the sense that privacy is presented
as something the individual or the user can achieve or
preserve, as opposed to something that the individuals
are granted by some external power. In this regard, RKS
regularly references specific tools that individual users
can avail of to exercise and protect their privacy, includ-
ing virtual private networks (VPNs), the TOR browser
(a tool that camouflages users’ IP addresses), and vari-
ous encrypted communication options. In its June 2015
monthly report, RKS references a recent intervention
discussing the advantages of using the TOR browser
in the context of growing restrictions imposed by the
Russian government on the online sphere: “We saw a
sharp uptick in TOR browser use, because the new reality
pushes people to search for new solutions so they can ac-
cess their favouritewebsites. In addition, TOR can ensure
your privacy online” (RKS, 2015b, author’s translation).
Importantly, the RKS discourse links privacy to spe-
cific rights of networked citizens, such as anonymity, se-
crecy, unhindered distribution of information, access to
digital networks, and encryption. In a public lecture on
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digital rights for students, trainee lawyers and civic ac-
tivists in Moscow, held in September 2015 and men-
tioned in the monthly report for the same period, a rep-
resentative for RKS underscored that:
Protecting the rights and freedoms of a person in an
online environment is just as important as in everyday
life, and you should not forfeit your rights to privacy,
security and freedom to obtain and disseminate in-
formation under any circumstances. (RKS, 2015c, au-
thor’s translation)
In their reports, digital rights activists discuss examples
of user activity on specific platforms, such as Telegram,
and refer to personal data and user identification in
the context of these cases. For instance, in December
2017 RKS reports on a new ‘Battle for Telegram’ cam-
paign it launched in support of the Telegram messen-
ger, which was facing pressure from the Russian govern-
ment to share user information and encryption keys: “If
we do not protect this internet service that cares about
the privacy of our data today, Russian users may be-
come an easy target for cybercriminals and illegal actions
on the part of the state institutions” (RKS, 2017b, au-
thor’s translation).
When discussing the need to protect individual
privacy and personal data flows, RKS unambiguously
points to the Russian state as the main threat against
which privacy must be protected. In multiple instances,
the activists critique new and upcoming internet reg-
ulations developed by the state, such as the ‘anti-
extremist’ Yarovaya law (Luganskaya, 2017). As observed
in the December 2016 monthly report summarising key
developments in Russian internet regulation in 2016
(RKS, 2016b, author’s translation), RKS experts see the
Yarovaya law as “eradicating privacy by default” for
Russian internet users. Thus, the notion of personal in-
formation security is presented in terms of what citizens
can do to protect their privacy online, and how this in-
dividual agency is contested by the state as part of its
national security discourse.
As an activist and advocacy organisation, RKS sees its
mission as more than offering legal defence and techno-
logical solutions (such as their VPN Love project recom-
mending verified VPN services). Crucially, activists also
promote individual agency by asking the users to defend
themselves from state surveillance and fight for their pri-
vacy. This is supported by RKS’s own initiatives, such as
the SAFE Project announced in January 2017 and aimed
at educating the public about a range of anti-surveillance
and privacy tools: “Roskomsvoboda is launching a new
resource—Project SAFE—about self-defence tools for in-
ternet users to protect themselves from surveillance and
intrusions into their personal data and correspondence”
(RKS, 2017a, author’s translation).
Privacy-related agency, the activists argue, can be
achieved through increased public debate and digital lit-
eracy, and this alignswith their advocacy efforts aimed at
giving the users more control over their information and
online presence. These efforts include public documenta-
tion of state persecutions against internet users, dissem-
inating detailed instructions on how to appeal internet-
related charges, and developing practical tips on protect-
ing oneself from digital surveillance. As RKS notes in its
mission statement on its website: “Our aim is for every
RuNet [Russian Internet] user to be able to defend their
[digital] rights” (RKS, 2019, author’s translation).
4.3. Privacy: Contextual, Relational, and Political
In both the state regulator’s and the digital rights ac-
tivists’ public online discourses, privacy is constructed
as contextual, relational, and political. However, these
articulations diverge greatly in terms of the normative
foundations on which they are constructed. The discur-
sive divergence also extends to how privacy is reflected
and enacted by both the state and activists in terms of
policy, regulations, and sanctions, as well as in terms
of grassroots action, digital literacy efforts, and digital
rights initiatives.
As a state institution, RKN interprets privacy of in-
dividual data and information flows predominantly in
the context of Russia’s national security and digital
sovereignty concerns. In this almost geopolitical view, in-
dividuals are viewed not as independent agents empow-
ered to protect their own private lives, but as ‘personal
data subjects’ of the state, whose data require state pro-
tection, regulation, and control. This contextual interpre-
tation of privacy is reflected in the Russian regulatory
landscape over the past decade: Legislative acts such
as the Yarovaya law (Luganskaya, 2017) and the inter-
net sovereignty law (Lipman & Lokot, 2019) approach in-
ternet governance, online safety, privacy, and personal
information as matters of national security, while the
power to regulate and protect resides in the hands of
state institutions. Privacy, therefore, emerges as a rela-
tional concept wherein the institutions of the state, be
they telecom regulators such as RKN or law enforcement
bodies, are involved in mediating and enabling individ-
ual private life, while also remaining constantly in con-
trol of personal data flows and in possession of access to
individual data and metadata of Russian citizens. As the
state and its institutions see themselves as granting pri-
vacy to citizens, they also conclude that they have the
power and the right to grant or withhold privacy. This is
reflected in the multiple instances of arbitrary requests
for user data from social media platforms (Gadde, 2019;
Lokot, 2016), alleged violations of privacy against oppo-
sition activists (Seddon, 2016), and the selective appli-
cation of legal norms to persecute users for online ex-
pression (Mostovshchikov, 2015). This ongoing struggle
for control over the field of privacy (with foreign govern-
ments, platforms, and users themselves) renders privacy
as a clearly political issue for the Russian networked au-
thoritarian state. However, the politics here is that of a
hegemonic state that seeks to preserve the status quo
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 314–322 319
and to retain its power over information and data flows
at the cost of the individual agency of its citizens.
In contrast, digital rights activists at RKS view privacy
in the context of digital rights and freedoms and discur-
sively present it as a key individual right in the digital age.
For RKS, privacy is a key expression of individual agency
as it is something each person can achieve or protect if
given the proper tools and knowledge. This is reflected
in RKS’s digital literacy initiatives such as Project SAFE
(described in Section 4.2 above). The activists also con-
strue of privacy as relational, but in a different sense: For
them, the struggle is that of the individual user attempt-
ing to wrestle the privacy of their data and their personal
security from the grasp of the state. This is why RKS and
their allies launch and maintain grassroots campaigns in
support of privacy-enabling platforms such as Telegram
(Novaya Gazeta, 2017) or in defence of individuals perse-
cuted by the state for using privacy and anonymity tools,
such as Russian TOR relay node operator Dmitry Bogatov
(Gilmour, 2017). Though privacy-enhancing technologies
are seen as beneficial in terms of user agency in gen-
eral, it is the state that is seen as the biggest threat in
the conditions of Russia’s networked authoritarianism. In
this respect, RKS also intervenes in the development and
implementation of internet and privacy regulations, sub-
mitting opinions on new initiatives it believes to threaten
privacy such as facial recognition systems (Kornya, 2019)
and contesting legal sanctions impinging on user privacy
in court (RKS, 2020).
In the circumstances of diminishing space for free ex-
pression and genuine political participation, digital rights
activists promote a political articulation of privacy as a
crucial condition of individual freedom to exercise polit-
ical agency and to renegotiate the balance of power—
both power writ large and power over the private lives of
individuals—with the dominant governing regime. The
activist politics of privacy, therefore, is aimed at the
transformation of the status quo and at bringing about
change at the grassroots level.
5. Conclusion: Data Subjects vs. People’s Data
This study examines the discursive representations of is-
sues surrounding privacy by the Russian state internet
regulator RKN and by digital activist group RKS, and uses
this discursive analysis to highlight relevant concerns in
the Russian public sphere with regard to technological
systems and digitally-mediated practices related to flows
of personal information. This study contributes to the
existing scholarship on internet governance and digital
rights and offers critical insights into how privacy poli-
tics informs the contestation of citizenship and, conse-
quently, the distribution of power in different kinds of
democratic systems, including hybrid regimes such as
Russia. The study also makes a contribution to the schol-
arship on privacy politics in media and communications
research by using corpus linguistics tools for privacy-
related discourse analysis.
Though both the state telecom regulator and the ac-
tivists construe privacy as contextual, relational, and po-
litical, their interpretations of privacy and their privacy
politics diverge significantly. By examining the articula-
tions of the concerns, norms and regulations around pri-
vacy by the state institutions and grassroots digital rights
advocates, I show how the struggle for control over ac-
cessibility of private data and resistance against restric-
tions of personal data flows lead to two different con-
cepts of the politics of privacy in Russia.
I find that the networked authoritarian Russian state
sees its citizens as vulnerable data subjects with little
agency, whose private identities and communications
should be protected from ‘foreign interference,’ but
must always remain visible and accessible to the state.
On the other hand, Russian digital rights activists advo-
cate for privacy as a human right and argue that tech-
nologies such as encryption and VPNs should be widely
adopted by citizens to preserve their agency and protect
their data and identities from the state. These tensions
between interpretations of privacy by the Russian state
and Russian citizens inform how privacy is negotiated as
part of the ongoing political dissent and the struggle over
divergent political visions of Russian society.
The differential understandings of how anonymity,
secrecy, confidentiality, and control of personal data de-
termine the distribution of power and agency in Russian
public and political life shape the resulting politics of pri-
vacy in Russia, as reflected in the state’s struggle for con-
trol over accessibility of private data and the grassroots
resistance against restrictions of personal data flows.
These divergent politics are reflected in privacy-related
policing and control on the part of the state, and in
privacy-related advocacy, activism, and digital literacy ini-
tiatives of activist groups. Amid the precarity of online ex-
pression and the struggle for control over personal data
flows, the ongoing contestation of privacy-related power
has implications for what kind of political future Russian
citizens might anticipate: one where they are ‘data sub-
jects’ at the mercy of a hegemonic state or one where
their privacy enables greater political agency and allows
them to refashion society towards a more equal, demo-
cratic, and rights-based vision.
Beyond Russian borders, many former Soviet states
that Russia counts within its sphere of influence are
closely watching the developments in internet gover-
nance and digital identity policies developed and con-
tested in Russia. Further research by media and com-
munication scholars focusing on Central and Eastern
Europe should therefore examine the possible repressive
or democratising impact of the discursively contested
articulations of privacy politics in Russia on its neigh-
bour states. Related research could also examine the
overlaps and divergences of emergent privacy politics
within EU states and within Russia, in light of the recent
adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation and
greater attention to personal data protection and pri-
vacy concerns.
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